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Imagine you want to learn more about a recently-passed law.
In doing so, you attempt to access the U.S. Justice Department's
website.
But instead of "www.usdoj.gov," you accidentally type
"www.usdoj.com" into your web browser. As a result, you do not
access the Justice Department's website, but instead another website
displaying content that is deeply offensive to you-for example, a
terrorist website spreading anti-U.S. propaganda. Something similar
happened to German Internet users in 2001. When they tried to
access the German Ministry of the Interior's website, they accidentally
ended the Ministry's web address by typing ".com" instead of the
correct ".de," and as a result were taken to a Neo-Nazi website
containing Nazi symbols and hate speech, both of which are illegal
under German law.1 The website was run by U.S.-based Neo-Nazi
Gerhard Lauck, who had placed it on a server stationed in the United
States and thus outside of the jurisdiction of German laws. Only after
Germany filed a lengthy trademark infringement complaint before the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) was the website
2
eventually taken down.
The case illustrates a widespread problem of the Internet age.
No other technology has ever allowed people to disseminate their
views to a global audience as rapidly as the Internet. In the most
common scenario, a person gains access to the Internet through an
Internet Service Provider (ISP) and expresses his views on a website
that is stored on a server, accessible to Internet users all over the
world. 3 Because the Internet crosses national borders so easily,
4
countries struggle to regulate it through national legislation.
Countries can regulate Internet content published by ISPs stationed
5
within their borders because national law applies to these providers.

1.
See, e.g., Winfried Brugger, The Treatment of Hate Speech in German
Constitutional Law (Part I), 4 GERMAN L.J. 1, 2, 16 (2003), available at
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol04No01/PDF
Brugger.pdf.

Vol_04_No_01_01-44_Public_

2.
See THE STEPHEN ROTH INSTITUTE, ANTI-SEMITISM AND RACISM: UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (2001-2002), http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw200l-2/usa.htm;

see also Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Republic of Germany) v. RJG Eng'g Inc./Gerhard
Lauck, No. D2002-0110 (WIPO Admin. Panel Decision 2002), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/
domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0110.html.
3.
See
generally
Jeff
Tyson,
How
Internet
Infrastructure
Works,
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet-infrastructure.htmlprintable (last visited Feb.
17, 2007). This process is described in detail infra in Part L.A
4.
See Keith Perine, The Trouble with Regulating Hatred Online, CNN.cOM, July
25, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/07/25/regulating.hatred.idg.
5.
See id.
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However, if an ISP is stationed abroad, a country's national laws
cannot regulate what the ISP publishes. 6 Yet due to the global nature
of the Internet, users within a country can view the content published
by foreign ISPs, thus circumventing national legislation. 7
Because national legislation cannot reach Internet content
published abroad, this note proposes that countries should establish
an international organization for the regulation of Internet content.
Such an organization could serve as a forum in which countries could
collaborate with ISPs and private Internet businesses, such as
Amazon and eBay, to agree on what Internet content should be
accessible in each country. Rather than a uniform international
regulatory scheme, such a solution would attempt to respect each
country's specific preferences regarding Internet regulation. Reaching
out to ISPs and private Internet businesses located abroad, each
country could more effectively regulate which Internet content would
be accessible within its national borders.
Because of the global nature of the Internet, an international
solution is arguably the only viable method for effectively regulating
Internet content. A country cannot solve its problems by banning
offensive content from servers stationed within its borders when its
citizens can still access websites from servers stationed abroad.
Additionally, different countries have different preferences as to what
Internet content they want to ban. Germany and several European
countries want to ban certain forms of hate speech, in particular NeoNazi ideology that is often spread by servers stationed in the United
States.8 The United States has generally allowed the expression of
Neo-Nazi ideology and similar hate speech with reference to the First
Amendment's broad protection of speech. 9 However, the United States
has attempted to ban certain pornographic material and has recently
banned Internet gambling.10
China has banned politically

6.
See id.
7.
See id.
8.
KidShield,
International
Internet
Politics:
Borderless
Technology,
http://www.kidshield.com/politics/politics international.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
9.

See, e.g., ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, COMBATING EXTREMISM IN CYBERSPACE:

THE LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING INTERNET HATE SPEECH 3 (2000), http://www.adl.orgl

CivilRights/newcyber.pdf; see also infra Part II.B.2.
10.
Steven M. Hanley, International Internet Regulation: A

Multinational

Approach, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 997, 1003-04 (1998); U.S. Ban Sparks

Web Gaming Crisis, http://www.poe-news.com/stories.php?poeurlid=64750
Feb. 17, 2007).

(last visited
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objectionable material," and Muslim countries may be interested in
banning content such as caricatures of Mohammed, which are
12
considered sacrilegious under Islam.
Because countries have diverging preferences as to what
content they want to ban, as well as to what content they do not want
to ban, it is difficult for them to agree on one regulatory solution that
would be applied to all countries. This problem became clear during
the latest effort for an international regulation of the Internet: the
Cybercrime Treaty. The United States signed the main part of the
treaty, which deals with measures to prevent general Internet crimes
such as Internet fraud, but refused to sign an addendum to the treaty
that would ban Neo-Nazi websites and other sites spreading hate
speech.' 3 According to the United States, the addendum violates the
First Amendment's right to free speech, and the United States cannot
sign a convention that abridges a constitutional protection. 14
However, because many servers, and especially those that spread hate
speech content, are stationed within the United States, 5 any solution
without U.S. participation severely limits the effectiveness of any
international regulation.
Because of such problems, any international Internet
regulation must allow for country-specific solutions. An international
organization is the best vehicle for achieving this goal. Such an
organization could provide a forum for regular meetings and
agreements between countries and ISPs as well as private Internet
business. ISPs could regulate what content would be available in a
specific country, while businesses like Amazon and eBay could
regulate what products they sell to customers abroad.
Thus,
governments and business could work out country-specific solutions.
For governments, this is desirable because it would more effectively

11.

See Hanley, supra note 10, at 1005-06; see also JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu,

WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 87-90 (2006).

12.
See Mohammad Kamran, SC Seeks Legal Avenues to Ban Blasphemous
Cartoons Worldwide, DAILY TIMES, Mar. 14, 2006, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.
asp?page=2006\03\14\story_14-3-2006_pg1-7.
13.
See Declan McCullagh & Anne Broache, Senate Ratifies Controversial
Cybercrime Treaty, CNET NEws.coM, Aug. 4, 2006, http://news.com.com2100-7348_36102354.html.
14.
Declan McCullagh, U.S. Won't Support Net "Hate Speech" Ban, CNET
NEWS.COM, Nov. 15, 2002, http://news.com.com/2100-1023-965983.html.
15.
Isabelle Rorive, Freedom of Speech v. Hate Speech in the Council of Europe,
Presentation at the Center for Media & Communication Studies Conference: Hate Speech
from the Street to Cyber-Space (Mar. 31, 2006), availableat http://www.cmcs.ceu.hu:8080/
cmcs/HSRorive.doc.
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regulate what content can be accessed in their countries. For ISPs
and other Internet-based companies, this would also be acceptable
because it would enable them to do business in countries without
encountering legal challenges, fines and other pressure to change
their policies.
This note advances the case for an international organization
to control Internet content. Part I describes the current state of
affairs with respect to Internet regulation. First, this part describes
briefly how the Internet works, to the extent that such a description is
necessary to advance the argument presented in this note. Second,
concentrating on Europe, the United States, and China, Part I
describes the diverging preferences of countries regarding Internet
regulation, the approaches they have taken, and the problems they
have encountered due to the international nature of the Internet.
Third, this part addresses the major attempt at international Internet
regulation to date, the Cybercrime Treaty of 200116 and its 2003 Hate
Speech Addendum. 17 As mentioned, the United States has refused to
sign the addendum and is unlikely to change its position in the future,
18
which severely undermines any uniform international regulation.
Finally, as a result of these problems, several solutions have been
advanced in favor of a more flexible international regulation of the
Internet. 19 Expanding on these solutions, Part II explains why an
international organization would be a more effective tool for
international Internet regulation. Finally, Part III addresses possible
criticisms of the approach advanced in this note. Despite certain
limitations, this note concludes that an international organization
would be a useful step towards an effective international regulation of
Internet content.

16.
Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, Europ. T.S. No.
185, availableat http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html]185.htm.
17.
Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Jan.
28, 2003, Europ. T.S. No. 189, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/
TreatiesHtm1189.htm [hereinafter Additional Protocol].
18.
See McCullagh, supra note 14.
19.
See, e.g., Hanley, supra note 10, at 1012; Rorive, supra note 15.
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I. BACKGROUND

A. A Brief Descriptionof How the Internet Works
To understand to what extent governments can react to
Internet content that they find objectionable, as well as to what extent
they cannot respond to such content, it is necessary to first obtain a
basic understanding of how the Internet works. The Internet is a vast
network that consists of numerous smaller networks located all over
the globe. 20 From a personal computer, an Internet user connects via
a modem or a similar device to an Internet Service Provider (ISP). An
ISP "is a business or organization that provides to consumers access to
the Internet and related services." 21 There are large national ISPs,
such as America Online (AOL), as well as small regional and local
ISPs. 22 Individual networks connect to each other through Network
Access Points (NAPs). 23 Two ISPs that run smaller networks agree to
specific NAPs, "and traffic between the two [ISPs] flows between the
networks at the NAPs." 24 The Internet is a collection of ISP networks
"that agree to all intercommunicate with each other at the NAPs" in
this way. 25
Every computer connected to the Internet has a unique
identification number, its Internet Protocol (IP) address. 26 Likewise,
websites have IP addresses that are linked to their text name, or
"domain name." 27 A website can be identified either by its IP address
or its domain name. 28 Some computers are "servers." A server is a
computer that stores information and provides services for other
computers, or "clients."29 If an Internet user creates a website, the
site is stored on a server and can be accessed from there. ISPs

20.
Tyson, supra note 3.
21.
Wikipedia.org,
Internet
Service
Provider,
Internetservice-provider (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).

22.

RAIDStorage.uk.com,

Technical

Glossary,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki

http://www.raidstorage.uk.com

glossary.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
23.
Tyson, supra note 3.

24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.

27.

See id. (explaining that, for example, "howstuffworks.com" is the domain name

of the site Howstuffworks).
28.
Id.
29.
Microsoft, Microsoft Windows Small Business Server 2003 Resource Kit: What
is
a
Server?,
http://www.microsoft.com/smallbusiness/products/server/resourcekit/server.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
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manage servers by providing space on which servers can publish
information that is then passed on to the client computers.
This structure explains the main way in which a country can
react to an objectionable website located abroad. For example, a
European government may object to a website stationed in the United
States that publishes content whose display is illegal in Europe but
Because the Internet is simply an
legal in the United States.
interconnection of networks, the European government can request
one of its national ISPs to block the connection to the American ISP
The European ISP can identify the
that displays the website.
objectionable website by its domain name or its IP address and block
access to the site at the government's request.
However, there are two problems with this approach. First,
blocking the connection to an ISP blocks all websites running via this
ISP, not merely the objectionable website. 30 As a result, many
websites that do not contain any objectionable content will be
blocked. 31 Second, even if the European ISP blocks the site by cutting
off the connection to the American ISP, the operators of the website
can simply re-register the same site through a different ISP.32 The
cycle then repeats itself. Clearly, targeting an objectionable website
located abroad by making a national ISP block that website is not the
33
optimal solution.

30.
31.
32.

KidShield, supra note 8.
Id.
See id.

33.

A second,

though

lesser-known

way

of accessing

a website

displaying

objectionable content stationed abroad, is via a proxy server. For example, let us assume
that a German ISP has blocked a questionable website in the U.S. A German user cannot
access this site. However, the user can access a proxy computer. A proxy is simply another
intermediate computer that could be stationed in the U.S. or another country outside
Germany. See generally Wikipedia.org, Proxy Server, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikil
Proxy-server (last visited March 18, 2007). The user tells the proxy the objectionable
website he wants to access, and the proxy connects to the website and sends its data to the
user. See id. The German ISP does not oppose this process as long as the proxy is not
blocked as well. See id. The user acquires the data of the website from the proxy's data
storage system and not from the website itself. See id. As a result, the German ISP cannot
detect the sending of the website data from the proxy to the user. Because this method is
technically quite sophisticated, it is not widely known.
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B. The Internet Preferences of Different Countries
1. Europe
European countries have probably felt the need for the
international regulation of Internet content most strongly. Several
European countries have laws restricting free speech, particularly
with regard to any denial that the holocaust occurred and the display
and spread of Nazi ideology. 34 Denying the Holocaust is a punishable
offense in Israel and eleven European countries. 35 Germany in
particular has very strict laws banning the Nazi party and any
glorification of it, including the denial of the Holocaust. 36 In Germany,
it is illegal to display or reproduce symbols used by the Nazis, as is
printing or distributing Neo-Nazi material. 37 Germany has repeatedly
enforced these laws in the Internet context. The case of Germany's
complaint against US-based Neo-Nazi Gerhard Lauck has already
been mentioned. 38 In addition, in 1996, Germany forced its largest
ISP, T-Online, to block access to a website displaying Neo-Nazi
material located in California. 39 This move came at a cost, since TOnline had to block access not only to the particular website but to its
whole server, thus blocking nearly 1500 other websites. 40 Under
German threat of potential action against the company, however, T41
Online complied with the order.
Like Germany, France prohibits the expression of pro-Nazi and
anti-Semitic views. 42 In 2000, a French judge ordered California-

34.
Abraham Cooper & Harold Brackman, Punishing Religious Defamation and
Holocaust Denial: Is There a Double Standard?, EQUAL VOICES, July 2006,
http://eumc.eu.int/eumc/index.php?fuseaction=content.dsp_cat-content&contentid=44bb8b
d0bdO9f&catid=4498115372afl&lang=EN (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).

35.

Id.

36.
Steve Kettmann, German Hate Law: No Denying It, WIRED.COM, Dec. 15, 2000,
http://www.wired.comlnews/politics/0, 1283,40669,00.html.
37.
Germany Said May Modify Nazi Symbols Law, Assoc. PRESS, Oct. 2, 2006,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2006/10/02/international/il35042D92.DTL;
see also KidShield, supra note 8.
38.
THE STEPHEN ROTH INSTITUTE, supra note 2.
39.
Tony Taylor, The Internet:
The New
Free Speech
Battleground,
http://www.cosc.georgetown.edu/-denning/cosc450/papers/taylor.html (last visited Feb. 17,
2007).
40.
KidShield, supra note 8; see also Taylor, supra note 39.
41.
KidShield, supra note 8.
42.
Stephen Lawson, Judge DismissesFrench Case Against Yahoo!, CNN.COM, Nov.
12,
2001,
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/TECH/industry/1 1/12/french.yahoo.case.idg/
index.html.
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based ISP Yahoo! to block French citizens from accessing auction
listings and web pages on its site containing Neo-Nazi and antiSemitic content, threatening to fine Yahoo! about $13,600 a day if it
did not comply. 43 At Yahoo!'s request, U.S. District Court Judge Fogel
declared the French judgment unenforceable in the United States
because it violated the First Amendment. 44 According to Fogel,
"[a]lthough France has the sovereign right to regulate what speech is
permissible in France, this court may not enforce a foreign order that
violates the protections of the United States Constitution by chilling
45
protected speech that occurs simultaneously within our borders."
After the San Francisco Court of Appeals reversed the decision,
the Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the decision en banc. 46 The court
decided against Yahoo!, holding that the case was not ripe for
adjudication. 47
However, the proceedings on appeal were more
complicated than this final judgment would suggest. The plaintiffs in
the original suit, members of a French anti-racist group, raised two
issues on appeal. 48 First, they argued that the U.S. District Court
"lacked personal jurisdiction over them"; second, that the lawsuit was
not ripe because it had been filed before Yahoo! "faced any realistic
prospect of harm." 49 On both of these issues, a majority of judges
50
actually decided in Yahoo!'s favor.
Yahoo! lost because the three 9th Circuit judges who dissented
from the en banc court's personal jurisdiction holding combined with
the three other judges, who thought personal jurisdiction existed but
that Yahoo!'s lawsuit was unripe, to produce a 6-5 majority in favor of
overturning the declaratory judgment in Yahoo's favor.
Thus,
although Yahoo! seemingly won on both issues raised on appeal, it
51
nevertheless lost the appeal.
Even though Yahoo! lost, because both of the factual issues on
appeal were decided against the French plaintiff, it seems doubtful
that the Yahoo! case will have strong precedential value for future

43.

Troy Wolverton, Court Shields Yahoo from FrenchLaw, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov.

8, 2001, http://news.com.com/2100-1017-275564.html.
44.
Rorive, supra note 15.
45.
Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wolverton, supra note 43.
46.
Rorive, supranote 15.
47.
Id.
48.
Howard J. Bashman, In Nazi MemorabiliaFight, Yahoo Can't Win for Losing,
LAW.COM, Jan. 23, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jspid=l137665111229.

49.

Id.

50.
51.

Id.
Id.
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foreign plaintiffs suing American companies for violations of their
national laws.
The German and French cases show that European countries
have struggled to enforce their national legal standards in the
Internet context. Even though Germany successfully forced one of its
ISPs to block access to a U.S. server displaying objectionable content,
it could only do so at the cost of simultaneously blocking a broad range
of non-objectionable websites. 52 Moreover, while Germany might be
able to prevent access to some U.S.-based servers by regulating its
large national ISPs such as T-Online, there are many small ISPs
stationed in the United States that Germany simply cannot reach. All
that is needed is a right-wing ideologist setting up a small, local server
in the United States that cannot be reached by one of the large
national ISPs in Europe. As a result, "German xenophobes... [could]
easily have their Web sites hosted from the States, which in turn
[could] be accessed from anyplace." 53 There are many servers run by
small local ISPs who disseminate hate speech in this way. "In 2002,
the Council of Europe recorded 4,000 xenophobic websites around the
world, compared to 160 in 1995. Over half of these were hosted in the
United States, where xenophobic speech is protected under the
54
Constitution, in the name of freedom of expression."
2. United States
In general, the United States has been much more reluctant
than Europe to regulate the Internet. The main reason is the First
Amendment's protection of free speech, which includes most kinds of
offensive or hate speech. Recent developments, however, such as the
signing of the Cybercrime Treaty, the passing of legislation against
Internet gambling, and the use of the Internet by terrorists, suggest
that the United States is nevertheless amenable to international
Internet regulation, albeit in a limited capacity.
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states,
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press." 55 The Supreme Court has traditionally interpreted this
provision rather strictly, allowing federal and local government to

52.
53.
54.
2002),

KidShield, supra note 8.
Perine, supranote 4.
Rorive, supra note 15 (citing EUR. PARL. ASS. DEB. 4th Sess. 9538 (Sept. 5,
available at
http://assembly.coe.intfMain.asp?link=Documents[WorkingDocs/

Doc02/EDOC9538.htm).
55.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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restrict free speech only in limited circumstances. 5 6 According to the
Court, good and bad ideas should compete in the "marketplace of
ideas," with the bad ideas being tested and rejected over time. 57 This
logic also applies to ideas represented through hate speech: by
comparing those ideas with better alternatives, people will generally
58
reject hate speech so that formally banning it is not necessary.
Following this doctrine, the Court has allowed a ban of hate speech
only in very limited situations, such as when such speech constitutes a
direct threat against an identifiable individual, fulfills the legal test
59
for harassment, or incites immediately lawless action.
This reluctance to restrict free speech is also apparent in the
Court's approach to Internet regulation. In 1997, the Supreme Court
deemed unconstitutional the Communications Decency Act (CDA), the
main attempt towards Internet regulation in the United States to
date. 60 Passed in 1996, the CDA sought "to protect children from
indecent and patently offensive material on the Internet."6 1 According
to the Court, the CDA was too broad because it "effectively
suppresse[d] a large amount of speech that adults have a
constitutional right to receive and to address to one another."62 The
Court suggested that it would apply a similarly rigid approach to the
regulation of free speech on the Internet. Subsequently, the Child
Online Protection Act (COPA) of 1998 was challenged immediately
after it was signed into law and has been declared unconstitutional
twice by appellate courts. In addition, the Supreme Court has upheld
an injunction barring prosecutors from filing criminal cases under
COPA. 63 While COPA's successor, the Children's Internet Protection
Act (CIPA), was upheld as constitutional in 2003, it faced similar legal
64
challenges.
A number of recent developments suggest that the United
States is nevertheless interested in at least some form of international
Internet regulation. First, in the summer of 2006, the Senate ratified

56.

See, e.g., ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 9, at 3.

57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997).
60.
Stephen T. Maher, Government Regulation of Internet Content (Mar. 1997),
61.
http://www.usual.com/article4.htm.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 874.
62.
63.
Declan McCullagh, Supreme Court Keeps Net Porn Law on Ice, CNET
NEWS.COM, June 29, 2004, http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-5251475.html.
64.
See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 202-03 (2003).
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the Cybercrime Treaty, 65 a convention signed by thirty-eight European
nations as well as Canada, Japan and South Africa, to harmonize
computer crime laws. 66 While the United States has not signed an
addendum to the treaty dealing specifically with hate speech on the
Internet, the United States is at least demonstrably willing to
participate in discussions about international Internet regulation. 67
Second, in October 2006, the United States passed legislation
outlawing Internet gambling. 68 Because online gambling is legal in
other countries, and the United States cannot effectively ban Internet
content that is published abroad, it is likely that the new law against
Internet gambling could renew U.S. interest in some form of
international regulation. The arrest of the CEO of a British online
gambling company during a business trip in the United States in July
2006 foreshadowed some of the problems that the United States might
69
soon encounter in attempting to enforce the new law.
Third, the use of the Internet by terrorists has sparked a
renewed interest in Internet regulation. After September 11, 2001,
The Federal Bureau of Investigation shut down several websites
created by Azzam Publications, named after Sheikh Azzam, Osama
Bin Laden's mentor. 70
Since terrorist activity on the Internet
continues to be a debated issue, similar action might be expected in
the future.
3. China
China has already set up its own Internet regulation system in
order to regulate dissident speech and maintain political control over
the population. 71 The Chinese government uses a firewall system to

65.
McCullagh & Broache, supra note 13.
66.
Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime: Chart of Signatures and
Ratifications, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=8&
DF=18/06/04&CL=ENG (listing the ratification date for each Member State of the Council
of Europe) (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
67.
McCullagh, supra note 14. For a detailed discussion of the treaty addendum,
see infra Part I.C.1.
68.
Frank Ahrens, New Law Cripples Internet Gambling, WASH. POST, Oct. 14,
2006, at A01.
69.
Michael McCarthy, U.S. Cracking Down on Offshore Betting Industry, USA
TODAY, July. 18, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/2006-07-18-online-gaming-x.htm.
70.
Edgar Burch, Comment, Censoring Hate Speech In Cyberspace: A New Debate
in a New America, 3 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 175, 180 (2001).
71.
See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 11, at 92-97; Hanley, supra note 10, at 1005-
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control which websites its citizens can access.7 2 A firewall is a
program that filters information before it reaches a personal computer
or network. 73 If incoming information is "flagged by the filters, it is
not allowed through." 74
Special "Internet Police" can identify
objectionable websites and subsequently ban them through firewall
software. 5
This system has generally been quite efficient and subtle in
76
allowing the Chinese government to regulate Internet content.
However, this approach also has certain disadvantages. First, it is
costly and labor-intensive-many government agencies are involved in
77
monitoring and keeping up the government's control of the Internet.
Moreover, "because of the government's extraordinary system of
monitoring and filtering, the Chinese Internet is becoming less and
less like its Western counterparts."7 8 Due to the international nature
of the Internet, as well as the fact that many of its innovations occur
in the United States, China risks losing pace with global technical
developments. Finally, censorship is generally problematic because it
stifles innovative ideas, and because it is ultimately ineffective in
withholding information from the population. 79 In any case, given its
own attempts, China arguably should be interested in an
international regulation of Internet content.

72.

GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 11, at 92.

73.
Jeff Tyson, How Firewalls Work, http://www.howstuffworks.com/firewall.htm
printable (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
74.
Id.
75.
76.

GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 11, at 93-94.
Id. at 94.

77.
See id. at 93.
78.
Id. at 89.
79.
Even members of the Chinese Communist party are apparently aware of the
latter problem. Thus, a group of former senior Communist Party officials recently criticized
the Chinese system of Internet censorship by stating, "History demonstrates that only a
totalitarian system needs news censorship, out of the delusion that it can keep the public
locked in ignorance." Party Elders Attack China Censors, BBC NEWS, Feb. 14, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/4712134.stm.
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C. Practicaland Theoretical Steps Towards InternationalInternet
Regulation
1. Practical Steps
Several countries have already taken concrete steps towards
instituting international regulation of the Internet. For instance, the
Cybercrime Convention of 2001 and the Additional Protocol to the
Convention of 2002 seek to harmonize computer crime laws on issues
such as unauthorized intrusion into networks, child pornography, and
copyright infringement.8 0
The Cybercrime Convention has been
signed by thirty-eight countries, including most European countries,
Japan, and the United States.8 1 The U.S. Senate ratified it in August
2006.82

The Additional Protocol to the Convention has proven to be
controversial. Specifically addressing the issue of hate speech, the
Protocol seeks to "establish as criminal offenses under domestic law
...distributing, or otherwise making available, racist and xenophobic
material to the public through a computer system."8 3 Since many
European countries already have laws that criminalize hate speech,
they have signed the Protocol without reservation.8 4 In addition,
Canada, which has some most of the most comprehensive laws against
hate crimes in the world, recently signed the Protocol.8 5 However, the
United States has refused to sign. As a spokesperson for the U.S.
Justice Department stated, "[t]he important thing to realize is that
the U.S. can't be a party to any convention that abridges a
constitutional protection."8 6 Because a large number of Internet
servers, particularly those that host hate speech websites, are located

80.
McCullagh & Broache, supra note 13.
81.
Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime: Chart of Signatures and
Ratifications, supra note 66.
82.
McCullagh & Broache, supra note 13.
83.
Additional Protocol, supra note 17.
84.
As of February, 2007, twenty-nine European countries have signed the
Additional Protocol.
Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention on
Cybercrime: Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=189&CM=8&DF=3/2/2007&CL=ENG (last visited Feb. 28,
2007).
85.
Canada Signs Protocol to Fight Online Hate, OUT-LAW.cOM, July 12, 2005,
http://www.out-law.com/page-5901 [hereinafter CanadaSigns].
86.
McCullagh, supra note 14.
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in the United States, any international agreement without U.S.
87
participation will be of little significance.
2. Theoretical Approaches
The United States' refusal to sign the Additional Protocol
demonstrates that any "one-size-fits-all" approach to international
Internet regulation is unlikely to work. Different countries have
different preferences with respect to Internet content they want
banned, as well as to which content they refuse to ban. Scholars have
adopted two main approaches to the problem.
First, Steven Hanley has suggested a flexible multinational
solution for Internet regulation.8 8 According to Hanley, because
countries have diverging preferences and levels of tolerance regarding
Internet content, "[olne rigid unitary solution to international Internet
regulation is impossible."8 9 Consequently, Hanley suggests a model in
which each country agrees with its main national ISPs as to what
content is accessible to citizens. 90 Government agencies, located at the
national level, would work in concert with ISPs to identify
objectionable websites.9 1 Under the threat of liability, ISPs would
then block such websites at the government's request. 92 In this way,
each country is able to exercise its own level of regulation. 93 Finally,
by comparing individual approaches and considering useful portions of
each approach, countries could gradually implement a multinational
94
framework.
Second, Isabelle Rorive has advocated a regulatory model that
focuses on the problems European countries face in trying to reach
American ISPs. 95 Based on the 2001 European Directive on Ecommerce, Rorive suggests "a notice and take down procedure that
could help reach American hosting providers with business interest in

87.
88.

Rorive, supra note 15.
Hanley, supra note 10, at 999.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 1016.
Id.
Id. at 1018.
Id.
Id. at 1016.

94.

Id. at 1017. Hanley is a bit vague on how the individual approaches of countries

would be incorporated into a multinational framework. Apparently he imagines a "lowest
common denominator" solution, which would essentially consist of each country's
individual regulatory system supplemented by an international agreement consisting of
those measures that all or many countries could accept.
95.
Rorive, supra note 15.
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Europe, despite the First Amendment shield."96 The basic idea is that
European governments would notify American ISPs of objectionable
websites, and the ISPs would take down the website under the threat
of having their European assets frozen. 9 7 The ISPs are immune from
legal action as long as they comply with the warning that they are
hosting content that is illegal in Europe. 98
While Hanley's and Rorive's approaches are useful starting
points, they do not provide complete solutions for an international
Internet regulation. The main problem with Hanley's approach is that
it fails to explain how countries could reach ISPs located abroad.
*Even if countries can control their national ISPs, this may be
ineffective in regulating content that is accessible in a country if such
content originates abroad. Unless a government can also directly
come to an agreement with foreign ISPs, any regulation of national
access to the Internet will remain incomplete. Rorive's model does
provide for a method of reaching foreign ISPs. However, it only does
so with respect to ISPs with assets or business interests in Europe.
Because her method ultimately relies on the threat of reaching such
assets, it is not effective for those American ISPs that display
objectionable content but do not have any business interests in
Europe.
In addition, because Rorive's model focuses heavily on
Europe and the United States, it may not be as applicable to a global
solution. In sum, an improved model for an international regulation
of Internet content is needed.

II. WHY AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION COULD REGULATE THE
INTERNET MORE EFFECTIVELY

A. The Basic Idea
Instead of regulating the Internet on a nationwide basis,
countries should form an international organization to regulate
Internet content. Such an organization should not attempt to create a
uniform regulatory scheme for all countries. Rather, it would function
as a forum in which countries could meet in regular, pre-determined
intervals with ISPs and large, internationally-operating Internet
businesses such as Amazon.com and eBay. In this forum, countries

96.

Id.

97.
98.

Id.
Id.
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could continue to work out individual solutions with their national
ISPs. In addition, countries would have the opportunity to engage
foreign ISPs that publish Internet content from abroad. Countries
would be interested in such dialogue because it would give them an
opportunity to regulate Internet content that originates from beyond
their borders. Likewise, ISPs would have an incentive to engage in
negotiations with foreign countries because many of these ISPs
operate, or will often be potentially interested in operating, on a global
scale. 99 Yahoo!, for example, should have an incentive to talk to the
French government regarding its preferences for Internet regulation
because it can anticipate that France may fine its subsidiary, Yahoo!
France, for Yahoo!'s violations of French law by publishing content
that is illegal in France. While countries cannot punish foreign ISPs
as easily as they can fine their national ISPs, 10 0 foreign ISPs should
still have an incentive to consider another country's preferences as
long as these ISPs have any ties to the country or are potentially
interested in establishing such ties. In a global economy, an ISP
should be worried about the threat of having its foreign subsidiaries or
branches fined, or of being prohibited from carrying out business in a
In short, both countries and
potentially lucrative market.
internationally operating Internet businesses have an incentive to find
consensual solutions for each country's preferred mode of Internet
regulation. An international organization to regulate Internet content
would provide an ideal forum to find such solutions.
In addition to serving as a forum, an international organization
could provide centralized monitoring of Internet activity, pool
expertise, and address technical changes quickly and effectively.
Pooling expertise and being able to address technical developments
quickly are especially relevant to a technology as fast-paced and
changing as the Internet. Through these functions, an international
organization could help countries implement and enforce their
preferred modes of Internet regulation.
Finally, an international organization could harmonize the
approaches of different actors towards Internet regulation in the long

99.
Clearly, globalization continues to induce especially larger ISPs to expand their
services and operations globally. See, e.g., Press Release, AOL Canada, America Online
and Bertelsmann Launch AOL in Australia (Oct.7, 1998), http://canada.aol.com/
press/press_10_07_98.adp; Press Release, Yahoo! Inc., Yahoo! Mail to Kick-Off Emerging
International Market Expansion with Russian Language Version (Mar. 23, 2004),
http://yhoo.client.shareholder.com/press/ReleaseDetail.cfm?ReleaseID=l31468.
100.
See, e.g., Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F.
Supp. 2d 1181, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2001); see also Perine, supra note 4.
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run. According to a number of scholars, membership in international
organizations has the potential to not only change the behavior of
actors, but may even transform their identities and interests. 10 1 As a
result, an international organization could generate a more uniform
approach towards Internet regulation.
B. The Benefits of InternationalOrganizations
International relations scholars have long pointed out the
benefits of international organizations.
1. Providing a Forum for Negotiations
First, international organizations provide a forum that
facilitates negotiation and reduces transaction costs, which in the
context of interstate cooperation means the costs of making and
enforcing agreements. 10 2 Even though states may be aware that they
could benefit from cooperating on a specific issue, they may refrain
from doing so due to uncertainty over whether other states will later
comply with the agreement. 10 3
If one state complies with an
agreement, but a second state does not, cooperation could render the
first state worse off in relative terms. Therefore, states "naturally
respond to uncertainty by being less willing to enter into
104
agreements."'
However,
"international institutions
can reduce this
uncertainty by promoting negotiations in which transparency is
encouraged; by dealing with a series of issues over many years and
under similar rules, thus encouraging honesty in order to preserve
future reputation; and by systematically monitoring the compliance of
governments with their commitments."'0 5 If states deal with an issue
over many years through repeated rounds of negotiations, a state will

101.
See, e.g., Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social
Constructionof Power Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391, 418 (1992).
102.
See Robert 0. Keohane, InternationalInstitutions: Can Interdependence Work?,
110 FOREIGN POL'Y 82, 86 (1998). In general, the theories regarding international
organizations presented in this section refer to interactions among states. However, as will
be argued later, they could also apply to interactions between states and ISPs or other
Internet businesses. See infra Part II.C.1. Moreover, on some level, the disagreements
regarding Internet regulation are in fact disagreements among states: those states have
different attitudes regarding Internet regulation, and their laws reflect those attitudes and
shape the environment in which ISPs and other Internet businesses operate.
103.
Keohane, supra note 102, at 86.
104.
Id.
105.
Id.
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have little incentive to cheat in one round, because it can reasonably
expect the cheated state to reciprocate in the next round.
International organizations offer both a setting for different rounds of
negotiation and an institutional apparatus that can monitor whether
states comply with agreements.
2. Offering a Central Administrative Apparatus
Second, international
organizations
"allow
for
the
centralization of collective activities through a concrete and stable
organizational
structure
and
a
supportive
administrative
apparatus." 106
A central administrative apparatus has several
advantages:
[International organization] personnel coordinate and structure agendas, provide
background research, and promote successful negotiations. They keep track of
agreements on particular issues, trade-offs, and areas of disagreement, periodically
producing texts that consolidate the current state of play. They also transmit
private offers or assurances, improving the flow of information. 107

In particular, international organizations are able to produce a
common body of data that provides an important factual background
for decisions. 108
As such, they constitute a source of pooled
expertise. 109
3. Operating as an Independent Third Party
Third, international organizations can promote agreements by
operating as an independent, neutral third-party actor. 110
The
existence of an independent third party is particularly helpful when
negotiations are deadlocked."' In such a situation, an independent
third party may be able to provide an unbiased and therefore more
legitimate opinion. An example of an international organization
performing such a function is the WTO Dispute Settlement
Mechanism which provides impartial judgment for states deadlocked

106. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act
InternationalOrganizations,42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 4 (1998).
107.
Id. at 12.
108.
See id. at 13.

109.

Id.

110.
111.

Id. at 16.
See id. at 17.
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in trade disputes. 112 Today, states are increasingly making use of
11 3
such settlement mechanisms.
4. Reconstructing Identities and Interests
Finally, some scholars claim that cooperation can reconstruct
the identities and long-term interests of states."14 The theory is that
rational actors enter into agreements for the self-interested reason of
exploiting the benefits of cooperation, but in the long-term may
develop a collective identity based on shared norms.'1 5 A frequentlycited example of this process is the European Union: states
presumably initially entered into the EU merely to benefit from
cooperation, but today often tend to display what scholars have
described as a common European identity.1 16 The development of a
shared identity though an international organization may open new
possibilities for cooperation on specific issues.
In sum, international relations scholars have pointed out that
international organizations offer many potential benefits. To realize
these benefits, it is not surprising that even powerful states such as
the United States have increasingly relied on international
11 7
institutions to set rules and standards to govern specific activities.

112.
See, e.g., John H. Jackson, The Role and Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Mechanism, 2000 BROOKINGS TRADE F. 179, 180-89 (describing the development
of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism as a more legalistic, quasi-binding mechanism
building on its less formal predecessor under GATT); James McCall Smith, The Politics of
Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts, 54 INT'L ORG.
137, 137 (2000) (describing the increased delegation of trade disputes to impartial third
party adjudication).
See Jackson, supra note 112, at 188-89; Smith, supra note 112, at 137.
113.
See, e.g., Wendt, supra note 101, at 417.
114.
See id.
115.
116.
Id.
See Keohane, supra note 102, at 84.
117.
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C. An InternationalOrganizationto Regulate the Internet Would
Capture These Benefits
1. Why the Theoretical Model for International Organizations Fits the
Internet Context
An international organization to regulate Internet content
would capture the benefits of international organizations. Before
describing these benefits, however, it is necessary to explain why the
model outlined in the previous section applies to the Internet
regulation context. Scholars describing the benefits of international
organizations envision interactions among states."18 By contrast, in
the Internet context, negotiations within the setting of an
international organization would primarily occur between states
interested in some form of regulation and private firms, such as ISPs
and other large Internet businesses. Nevertheless, the situation is
comparable.
In classic international relations theory, states are
considered rational, utility maximizing actors. 1 9 The same is true for
Internet businesses, which, as private firms, are interested in
maximizing profits above all. Therefore, to the extent that both are
interested in maximizing utility, the situation between states and
transnational Internet businesses is comparable to the interaction
among states. 120
Moreover, both states and Internet businesses stand to gain
from cooperation. To effectively realize their preferred modes of
regulation, states need to involve foreign ISPs because those ISPs can
undermine national laws by publishing objectionable Internet content
from abroad.' 2' This should even be true for powerful states such as
the United States: according to international relations theorists, even
powerful states use international organizations to set rules and
standards in specific areas. 122 Without such participation, powerful
states may lose out on the potential benefits of international

118.
JOHN G.

JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 15, 17 (2001);
RUGGIE, CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL

INSTITUTIONALIZATION 9 (1998).
119.
RUGGIE, supra note 118, at 9.

120.
There are other differences between states and private businesses. However,
for the purpose of this note, utility maximization-which applies to both states and private
firms-is the most important factor.
121.
See supraParts L.A and I.C.2.
122.
Keohane, supra note 102, at 86.
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institutions and risk isolating themselves. Therefore, even the United
States, which has traditionally been skeptical of regulating speech,
should be interested in finding some form of international agreement
23
on Internet regulation.1
2. Benefits by Serving as a Forum for Negotiations
The first way in which an international organization would be
beneficial in the Internet context is by providing a forum for
negotiations between states and Internet businesses. Such a forum
would allow states to enforce their respective regulatory model against
their national ISPs. On a basic level, this would essentially reflect the
current state of Internet regulation: countries control the Internet to
the extent they can make national ISPs comply with national
legislation. For example, "[t]oday, German, French, and British laws
require local ISPs to screen out illegal content once they are notified of
124
its existence."'
However, an international organization as a forum would
additionally allow states to negotiate directly with foreign ISPs and to
encourage them to implement voluntary forms of regulation for
content they consider offensive. While a state cannot force a foreign
ISP to comply with its laws because foreign ISPs are not stationed
within the state's jurisdiction, many experts on Internet regulation
tout voluntary self-control as the best approach to encourage ISPs to
restrict offensive content. According to Rabbi Abraham Cooper, one of
the major activists in favor of restricting hate speech on the Internet:
[W]e have to turn to ISPs and firms to encourage them to set standards on their
own, to become good "online citizens" . . . [Flor example, by encouraging them to
adopt respective passages as part of their user conditions. In this way, it 12would be
possible to eliminate racist and anti-Semitic web pages from the Internet. 5

Several Internet businesses have already proven receptive to
voluntary self-regulation: "[fjree Web-based page-hosting services
126
such as GeoCities, Tripod and XOOM.com refuse to host hate sites."'
Likewise, services such as Angelfire and AOL have removed hateful
pages from their servers. 127 Some Internet businesses have even

123.
See supra Part I.B.2.
124.
GOLDSMITH & WU, supranote 11, at 73.
125.
Simone Rafael, Mut Gegen Rechte Gewalt [Stand up to Right Wing Violence],
Interview with Rabbi Abraham Cooper (July 23, 2004), http://www.mut-gegen-rechtegewalt.de/artikel.php?id=5&kat=39&artikelid=1144 (trans. by author).
126.
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 9, at 11.
127.

Id. at 11-12.
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removed objectionable content with explicit reference to the
sensitivities of foreign countries. Internet auction house eBay, for
example, banned the sale of Nazi memorabilia in 2001, stating:
As the eBay community expands around the globe, we are encountering different
laws and different points of view as to what constitutes illegal, offensive or
Given our expansion, as well as feedback we've received
inappropriate items ....
and concluded that these changes [banning
from our users, we reviewed our policy
128
Nazi memorabilia] are appropriate.

These examples show that Internet businesses have proven to be
receptive both to calls for self-regulation and to the proclivities of
foreign countries and underscore the fact that ISPs have an incentive
to honor such requests as a result of having business relations, or
potential business interests, in countries requesting regulation.
By serving as a forum for negotiation, an international
organization would allow cross-border negotiations regarding such
By providing a direct and institutionalized dialogue
measures.
between states and Internet businesses, such an organization would
recognize the reality that "[o]nly greater international cooperation can
help eradicate the scourge of racist and hate-related material made
In addition, an
increasingly accessible over the Internet. 129
international organization functioning as a forum would reduce
transaction costs by bringing all interested parties together in one
setting at one specified time and by allowing parties to exchange
experiences, compare solutions, and create synergies by coordinating
similar approaches.
3. Benefits from Providing an Organizational Apparatus
A second way in which an international organization could be
"Most
beneficial is by providing an organizational apparatus.
international organizations include a "secretariat or similar
Such an apparatus could employ
administrative apparatus." 130
experts, collect data, and follow new technical developments.13 1 In
this way, it could provide a sound factual basis for negotiations
In particular, an
between states and private businesses.
organizational apparatus could fulfill a function that many experts

Beth Cox & Thor Olavsrud, eBay Bans Nazi, Hate Group Memorabilia,
128.
http://www.internetnews.com/ec-news/
May
3,
2001,
INTERNETNEWS.COM,
article.php/4_75822 1.
Canada Signs, supra note 85 (quoting Hon. Irwin Cotler, Justice Minister of
129.
Canada).
130.
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 106, at 11.
131.
See id. at 11-12.
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have identified as crucial to regulating hate speech on the Internet:
monitoring. 132 As Rabbi Abraham Cooper explains: "because hate
sites constantly reappear under new addresses, we need intensive
monitoring of the Internet with respect to racism and anti-Semitismsomething that is still not done systematically."'133
At the moment, non-governmental institutions, such as the
International Network Against Cyberhate (INACH) or the Association
of Internet Hotlines (INHOPE), largely monitor the Internet. 3 4 These
institutions keep track of hate speech on the Internet, thus allowing a
better understanding and analysis of such activity. 135 Additionally,
they help to enforce national laws against hate speech. 136 INACH, for
example, is a network of worldwide institutions that allows Internet
users to report websites that contain hate speech. 137 INACH then
hands on the information to those institutions that may be able to
take action against the website.' 38 For example, assume that a Dutch
Internet user reports a website containing hate speech whose display
is illegal under Dutch law. 139 The website is published in the United
States and therefore not within Dutch jurisdiction.
In such a
situation, INACH can do two things: first, it can report the website to
its partner organization in the United States, which may be able to
exert pressure; second, it can notify Dutch authorities.' 40 These
authorities may not be able to take action against the creator of the
website, or the ISP that publishes the site, because both are based in
the United States. However, they can attempt to identify persons
associated with the website located in the Netherlands, such as the
4
Dutch webmaster who manages the Holland forum of the website.1 1
Because such persons may be criminally liable in the Netherlands,
this may well be a method to counteract the reach of the website.
While there are currently many private organizations such as INACH,
"a better monitoring of Internet hate speech, ideally carried out by a

132.
133.
134.

Rafael, supra note 125.
Id. (trans. by author).
See Simone Rafael, Mut Gegen Rechte Gewalt, Hetze im Internet: Was Kann

Gesetzgebung Leisten? [Stand up to Right Wing Violence, Internet Hate Speech: What Can
the Legislature Do?] (July 8, 2004), http://www.mut-gegen-rechte-gewalt.de/artikel.
php?id=39&kat=39&artikelid=1 123.
135.
See id.

136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

140.
141.

Id.
Id.
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centralized institution, would be desirable in order to allow for
concrete responses. 14 2
An international organization would be an ideal vehicle to
provide for such centralized monitoring. In fact, such an organization
could provide monitoring in a twofold sense. First, it could monitor
hateful activity on the Internet similar to institutions such as INACH.
Moreover, if an international organization were to perform the
monitoring, such an organization could pool resources, achieve
economies of scale, and thereby provide for greater efficiency. Second,
an international organization could monitor whether states and ISPs
comply with agreements. 143 Hence, by pooling expertise, providing
technical assistance, and carrying out centralized monitoring, an
organizational apparatus could facilitate an international regulation
of Internet content.144
4. An International Organization as a Neutral Third Party and
Potential Creator of Shared Norms
An international organization could function as a neutral third
party in negotiations between states and ISPs. States have given
international organizations the ability to perform this function in
other important areas. The WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism,
for example, regulates trade disputes despite the existence of national
Why should states not endow an international
trade laws. 145
organization to regulate Internet content with a similar function? In
the Yahoo! case, an American judge refused to uphold a French
ruling. 146 The case illustrates that due to the transnational nature of
the Internet, disputes involving Internet regulation can quickly cause
Therefore, providing an international
jurisdictional problems.
organization with an arbitration function might be a useful measure
in the Internet context.
Finally, over the long-term, an international organization
might be able to produce shared norms that could lead to greater
As
harmonization of approaches towards Internet regulation.
developments such as the Cybercrime Convention show, producing

Id. (trans. by author).
142.
This is the more traditional type of monitoring of international organizations
143.
that scholars envision. See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 106, at 14-15.
144.
See id.
See Jackson, supra note 112, at 185-89.
145.
See supra text accompanying notes 43-51.
146.
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147
international agreements in the Internet context is not impossible.
Likewise, while countries have different preferences and modes of
regulation, many countries seem to agree that counteracting Internet
hate speech is generally desirable. 148 In 2004, even the United States
"proposed a 10-point action plan to the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for addressing the profusion of racist,
xenophobic and anti-Semitic propaganda on the Internet. 14 9 Despite
adhering to a policy of broadly protecting free speech, "[t]he plan urges
OSCE states to prosecute criminal threats of violence on the Internet
and to collect and publish data on hate crimes, while nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) are urged to increase their monitoring of the
Internet ...
,"150 These developments suggest that a development of
shared norms in the Internet context might be possible. In line with
the predictions of some scholars, an international organization could
151
help develop such norms.

III. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION TO REGULATE THE INTERNET

While creating an international organization to regulate
Internet content would provide many benefits, the approach
admittedly has its limitations. First, it could be argued that an
international organization would be ineffective because it is unlikely
1 52
to include many of those ISPs that actually produce hate speech.
Even if an international organization could provide a forum in which
states and large, internationally-operating ISPs could meet, such a
forum is unlikely to include smaller ISPs that spread hate speech.
Much Internet hate speech is actually published by smaller servers
who often exist specifically for the purpose of producing such content.
An example is Stormfront, a U.S.-based ISP run by a former Ku Klux
Klan leader that hosts dozens of sites that espouse hatred of blacks,

147.
See, e.g., McCullagh & Broache, supra note 13.
148.
The Additional Protocol, which has been signed not only by European countries
but also by countries such as Canada and Japan, confirms this point. See Canada Signs,
supra note 85. In addition, while the United States has a different official position on hate
speech, as described above, there have been voluntary restrictions of Internet hate speech
in the United States. See supra Part II.C.2.
149.
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homosexuals, and Jews. 153 Hate sites such as Stormfront are unlikely
to participate in any type of international solution to restrict hate
speech. As a result, "even if ISPs such as Yahoo and EarthLink
completely purge xenophobic content, Stormfront is always waiting in
'154
the wings.
However, a forum for agreements between states and large,
internationally-operating ISPs would still be a helpful step in the
right direction. "Governments can achieve a large degree of control by
focusing on the most important ISPs that service the vast majority of
Internet users."15 5 In addition, the centralized monitoring that an
international organization could provide would help to specifically
observe and thereby to some degree control the activities of ISPs such
as Stormfront. Thus, while an international organization may not be
a perfect measure, it would still do much to contain Internet hate.
Second, it could be argued that an approach that is essentially
based on voluntary self-control by ISPs is toothless. As described in
the previous section, an international organization would to a large
extent be based on states and ISPs agreeing on voluntary restrictions
of objectionable Internet content.1 56 Why, it could be asked, would
private businesses accept the costs of voluntary restrictions?
However, as mentioned above, as long as an ISP has any assets or
potential business interests in a country, the threat of states reaching
those assets, or of restricting market access, is a real one. Moreover,
litigation such as the suit against Yahoo! France is costly for a
company, and being publicly associated with supporting hate speech
surely has no positive effect on a company's image. An ex-ante
agreement between an ISP and a state could avoid such costs, thus
providing for greater reliability in planning. The examples of ISPs
that have already agreed to voluntary self-restrictions confirm the
feasibility of such an approach.157
Third, countries have experimented with methods for
regulating Internet content that do not require forming agreements
with ISPs. As described above, China has installed a comprehensive
firewall system,1 5 8 and European countries have also considered

153.
154.
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installing filtering systems. 159 Why not use such methods rather than
forming an international organization? As China's experience shows,
16
a national filtering system is very costly 160 and labor-intensive. 1
While an international organization serving as a forum would produce
initial setup costs, it would not require countries to maintain an
expensive filtering system. As a result, attempting to find agreements
with ISPs may well be cheaper over the long-term than running a
comprehensive filtering system. 162 In addition, a national filtering
system risks isolating a country with respect to technological
progress, 63 while reaching agreements through an international
organization does not pose such a danger and may in the long-run
64
even produce greater harmonization of national approaches.
Finally, critics reject voluntary self-restriction as nothing more
than censorship.
According to this line of argument, voluntary
restrictions equal classical censorship in that both methods suppress
people from expressing unfavorable opinions. 165 "History has learned
[sic] us that societies which embrace 'censorship' are ultimately
doomed to self extinction."'' 66 Rather than censorship-voluntary or
not-people should be allowed to express ideas because the
"marketplace of ideas" will in the long-term ensure that good ideas
triumph over bad ones. 67 This logic also applies to hate speech on the
Internet. According to Kenneth McVay, the spokesperson for Nizkor,
an anti-Nazi online project which strongly supports free speech, "[he]
can cite examples where Web sites have been forced to remove
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outright lies, through the simple vehicle of exposing those lies
permanently, and doing so in a highly visible public forum.) 168
Against these arguments, advocates of voluntary selfrestriction argue that the Internet does not fit the classic marketplaceof-ideas model. 169 According to this view, hate sites "provide no
reasonable mechanism for discussion or debate.
There is no
opportunity to combat bad speech with more speech, and ensure that
people who see the former also have the opportunity to see the
latter."170 Considering the fact that different countries have different
preferences regarding Internet regulation, this debate misses the
point. In many countries, displaying certain content is simply illegal,
and the international nature of the Internet undermines the
enforcement of these laws. Against this background, an international
organization arguably provides a useful method to allow different
countries to implement their preferred modes of regulation. The
solution advocated in this note tackles this reality, rather than taking
sides in the debate on free speech.
IV. CONCLUSION

The attempt to apply national laws in the Internet context
presents a problem of international scope. Because the Internet
transcends national borders, no country can regulate it through
national legislation only. While national legislation allows a country
to control Internet content that originates within its borders, if an ISP
is located abroad, a country's national laws cannot regulate what the
ISP publishes. Yet because of the global nature of the Internet, users
within a country can view the content published by foreign ISPs, thus
bypassing national legislation.
An international organization to regulate Internet content
presents a powerful tool to deal with this problem.
Such an
organization could serve as a forum for negotiations between countries
and foreign ISPs as well as internationally-operating Internet
businesses. Through such negotiations, countries could attempt to
encourage foreign ISPs to implement voluntary forms of regulation
that would respect a country's national laws.
Moreover, an
international organization would provide the benefit of an
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organizational apparatus that could employ experts and follow new
technical developments. Finally, an international organization could
act as a neutral third party in transnational disputes between
countries and ISPs, eventually producing shared norms and a more
uniform approach to Internet regulation in the long run.
Because an international organization is unlikely to include
those ISPs that specifically aim to spread hate speech and other
objectionable content, it is not a perfect solution. However, by
including large, internationally-operating Internet businesses, an
international organization could contribute significantly towards
allowing countries to implement their national preferences regarding
Internet regulation. As a result, the Internet would not only be a
global medium that offers tremendous opportunities, but also one that
respects diverging national legislation to a greater extent.
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